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The Italian strategic plan for the energy policy targets 25% 
of the national generation mix covered by nuclear technology 
by 2030. Considering a demand for electric power of 340 TWh 
in 2010 and assuming an annual rate of increase between 2,5% 
and 1,0%, the national plan would require to build some 8-10 
large nuclear power plants, at least. The new generation 
capacity may be covered by EPR or AP1000 technology or, 
alternatively, by multiple SMR (i.e. 300-150 MWe), or even a 
mix of LR and SMR. 
The original intent, prior to the stop imposed by the 
dramatic earthquake and tsunami in Japan, was to have the first 
plant deployed by 2020. Today the Italian strategy to re-open 
the nuclear option is undergoing hard criticism and its fate is 
currently uncertain. In this context, this paper might contribute 
to the debate, by exploring the economics of the nuclear option 
with a focus on the opportunity to invest in large NPP category 
rather than in multiple, modular SMR. The latter have features 
that may compensate the dis-economy of scale and improve 
their cost-effectiveness, while granting investors with a lower 
up-front investment and a higher capability of project self-
financing. The analysis is run through the Polimi’s proprietary 
“INtegrated model for the Competitiveness Analysis of Small 
modular reactors” (INCAS).Even if some specific inputs are 
related to the Italian scenario (e.g. the Electricity price) the 
results can be generalized to countries or utilities that are 
planning to install more than 10 GWe of nuclear capacity. 
INTRODUCTION: ITALY AND NUCLEAR POWER 
1.1 Electric power consumption and sources in Italy 
With limited domestic energy sources, and not commercial 
nuclear plants, Italy is highly dependent on energy imports. 
Italy has proven crude oil reserves of 0.7 billion barrels 
however, the domestic production of approximately 100 000 
barrels per day meets only a limited amount of domestic 
consumption. In the last decade, the declining production from 
Italy's natural gas fields and the increases in domestic 
consumption have increased the country's reliance upon gas 
imports which arrive mainly by pipelines. Natural gas, 
renewable sources and solid fuels are gradually replacing oil in 
electricity generation. Final energy consumption has been 
increasing, while industry remains the most energy-consuming 
sector. Energy intensity is below EU-27 average, while CO2 
emission intensity is slightly above EU-27 average. [1] 
The total consumption of EE in the 2010 has been 338,963 
GWh, distributed as following [2] 
 Not renewable 219,750 GWh 64.8% 
 Renewable 75,269 GWh 22.2% 
 Net import 43,944 GWh  13.0% 
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Natural gas alone accounts for 153,800 GWh, the 45.4% of the 
total consumption. 90% of this gas is imported from North 
Africa and Russia. 
 
1.2 Nuclear power in Italy 
 
Italy was a pioneer of civil nuclear power and in 1946 
established the first scientific body to pursue this resource. In 
1952, it established the National Committee for Nuclear 
Research (CNRN) to develop and promote nuclear power, and 
this was reorganized in 1960 to become the National 
Committee for Nuclear Energy (CNEN, now the ENEA) 
Construction of the first civil reactor – a British Magnox gas-
cooled reactor – began in 1958 at Latina, and the following 
year construction of the first General Electric (GE) boiling 
water reactor (BWR) commenced at Garigliano. Construction 
of a Westinghouse pressurized water reactor (PWR) started in 
1961 at Trino Vercellese, also known as the Enrico Fermi 
Nuclear Power Plant.  
Anti-nuclear sentiment grew during the 1970s, although the 
nuclear industry continued to receive support from the national 
government. In the early 1980s, steps were taken to develop a 
standardized design. An energy plan adopted in October 1981 
called for three new plants of 2x1000 MWe each at Piedmont 
(the Trino site), Lombardy and Puglia. The reference design of 
these reactors would be based on Westinghouse PWR 
technology and developed within the Unified Nuclear Project 
(Progetto Unificato Nucleare, PUN). Alongside this project, 
Enel continued with plans to build two 982 MWe BWR units at 
the Montalto di Castro site. Construction commenced in 1982, 
but the project was delayed as a result of local opposition. 
A new energy plan was adopted by parliament in March 1986 – 
one month before the accident at Chernobyl – that called for 
further increases in nuclear capacity. [3] 
On 8 November 1987 the Italians were called to express their 
opinion on the possibility of stopping the civilian nuclear 
program. As Italy is close to Chernobyl, 80% of the votes were 
favorable to closing the program. Because of lack of funds and, 
generally speaking, mismanagement of the different 
governments in charge, the four nuclear plants existing in Italy 
were put on hold, but the decommissioning started only in 
2003. [4] 
 








Latina Magnox 153 1958 1963 1987 
Garigliano BWR 150 1959 1964 1982 
Trino Vercellese PWR 260 1961 1964 1990 
Caorso BWR 860 1970 1978 1990 
Montalto di 
Castro 
BWR 2x982 1982 - - 
Table1 - Italian NPP 
1.3 Scenarios in the pre- Fukushima events 
In 2004, a new energy law opened up the possibility of joint 
ventures with foreign companies in nuclear power generation 
and allowed the electricity import from them. 
After a memorandum of understanding in May 2005, Electricité 
de France (EDF) and Enel (the larger Italian Utility
1
) signed an 
agreement in November 2007 that gives Enel a 12.5% share 
(some 200 MWe) in the Flamanville-3 EPR nuclear reactor 
project (1650 MWe), currently under construction in France, 
and an option for the same stake in the next five such units to 
be built. Enel is also to be involved in design, construction and 
operation of the plants, thereby helping to rebuild Italy's 
nuclear skills and competences. Expected investment in the 
construction of Enel's share of Flamanville-3 is approximately 
€500 million; Enel is also responsible for its pro quota share of 
operation costs. The agreement also gave EDF an option to 
participate in construction and operation of future Enel nuclear 
power plants in Italy or elsewhere in Europe and the 
Mediterranean. To this end, in August 2009, EDF and Enel set 
up a 50:50 joint venture company, Sviluppo Nucleare Italia 
(SNI), to conduct feasibility studies preliminary to the 
construction of at least four 1650 MWe Areva EPR units.  
 
In May 2008, the Italian government confirmed its strong 
support to the nuclear program and declared that it would foster 
the construction of first new nuclear power plant within five 
years, to reduce the country's great dependence on oil, gas and 
imported power. The government introduced a package of 
nuclear legislation, including measures to set up a national 
nuclear research and development entity, to define criteria and 
procedures for reactor plants licensing and nuclear sites 
identification and licencing. The comprehensive economic 
development legislation was finally approved in July 2009 
making nuclear power a key issue of the new energy policy, 
with a 25% target of electricity generation from nuclear power 
by 2030. A national Nuclear Safety Agency has been set up in 
2010. 
 
In January 2011, the Constitutional Court ruled that Italy could 
hold a referendum on the planned re-introduction of nuclear 
power, as proposed by an opposition party. The question to be 
posed in the referendum, due to be held in mid-June, is whether 
                                                          
1   As well as its participation in new build in France, Enel is playing an 
active role in other countries. In 2004, it bought 66% of Slovakia's 
SlovenskeElectrarne (SE) with its four VVER 440/V213 Bohunice and 
Mochovce reactors there. Enel's subsequent investment plan included the 
completion of Mochovce units 3 & 4 – 942 MWe gross – by 2011-12 (see 
section on New nuclear capacity in the information page on Nuclear Power in 
Slovakia).In February 2009, Enel bought 25% of Spain’s Endesa power 
producer for €11 billion, taking its ownership to 92%. Endesa has equity in 
most of Spain's nuclear reactors: 100% of Ascó 1; 85% of Ascó 2; 72% of 
Vandellós 2; 36% of the two Almaraz units; and 50% of Garoñam.In April 
2010, Enel signed a wide-ranging agreement with Russia's Inter RAO UES 
which positions it to take up to a 49% share in Rosenergoatom's new 2340 
MWe Baltic nuclear power plant being built in Kaliningrad. This will be the 
first Russian nuclear plant with private or international equity, and Inter RAO 
intends to export about two-thirds of the power to Germany, Poland and the 
Baltic states  [4]. 
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voters want to cancel some 70 legislative and regulatory 
measures which have been taken by the government over the 
last three years to allow new nuclear power plants deployment. 
Public hearing would not affect plans for a waste repository. 
 
1.4  Post – Fukushima event 
March 11 - Fukushima I nuclear accidents (further information 
in [5]). As an aftermath of this dramatic event, on the wave of a 
strong opposition of the public opinion to the nuclear 
renaissance, Italian government set a moratorium of the 
procedures for the national sites identification and of all the 
legislative activity necessary to the NPP realization. .  [6] The 
moratorium resolution is in line with the general European 
debate for a deep reconsideration of the nuclear option and a re-
assessment of the safety issues, with more conservative criteria. 
The Italian Supreme Court will rule about the revocation of the 
public hearing about the nuclear option on account of the 
moratorium. 
THE INCAS MODEL 
 
Polimi’s nuclear economics research group is developing the 
INCAS (INtegrated model for the Competitiveness Assessment 
of SMR) model as the founding theoric and simulation 
framework for the economic comparative assessment of 
investment projects in SMR versus large NPP . 
INCAS  is a unique model able to account for “economy of 
multiples” benefits that characterize SMR investment 
paradigm. 
For the purpose of this analysis , INCAS consider about 
nominal 11,000MWe total capacity, installed either through 
multiple SMR or multiple LR. A comparative assessment of the 
alternative investment projects is performed, considering 
different plant size, configurations and technologies. INCAS’ 
“Investment Model” relies upon a cash flow analysis over the 
plant lifetime, feeded by all the main input of an economic and 
financial analysis (revenues, operating and capital costs, 
financial costs). The output of the analysis is a complete set of 
indicators and values of financial performance: profitability for 
a private investor or economic soundness for a public 
stakeholder. Monetary factors are considered together with 
other strategic factors generally not easily quantifiable (e.g. 
social acceptability) that may be differential between different 
NPP projects and are able to influence the investment success. 
These are considered as external factors and evaluated in a 
dedicated model of INCAS. The approach is  to assess the 
project attractiveness from a holistic point of view, The present 
analysis relies on the quantitative indicators provided by 
INCAS code. 
 
The “Investment Model” is based on a Discounted Cash Flow 
model and provides the indicators of the investment’s financial 
performances (e.g. IRR, NPV, cash flow profile). It includes the 
following modules: 
 Generation costs (construction costs, operation and 
maintenance costs,  fuel cycle, decontamination and 
decommissioning, amortization rate); 
 Revenues; 
 Financial (financing mix, cost of debt and equity, debt 
amortization period, tax rate, inflation, tax shield). 
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Unlike other simulation codes, INCAS’ Generation costs model 
is not a mere input section of the code: an original calculation 
routine allows to derive the construction costs of each 
successive NPP unit on the basis of its output size, design 
technology and learning accumulation. INCAS’ premise is that 
the cost of “n” NPP units is not equal to “n” times the cost of 
one NPP. Starting from a reference construction cost for a given 
design technology and a given reactor size, INCAS is able to 
calculate the construction cost for each of the successive NPP 
units of the same design technology, through a top-down 
estimation approach and on the basis of a given construction 
strategy in terms of schedule and site location. In particular the 
code takes into account: 
 economies of scale; 
 co-siting economies, due to fixed costs sharing by NPP 
built and operated on the same site; 
 construction cost savings, due to modularization effects, 
that are size-dependent; 
 learning economies, both at single site level and 
worldwide, with two different learning accumulation and 
decay laws; 
 effect of delay in the construction period; 
 cost of financing during construction period. 
THE DESIGN ROBUSTNESS OF SMR 
 
A high level of safety is the result of a complex interaction 
between good design, operational safety and human 
performances, but design features are able to impact on all of 
these three dimensions. Design robustness encompasses three 
key strategic performance areas: reactor safety, radiation safety 
(public and occupational) and safeguards, according to Reactor 
Oversight Process (ROP) of NRC [7]. From these key areas, we 
define Design Robustness the reactor’s capability to assure the 
core’s integrity, the protection and the integrity of all the other 
components of the nuclear island, in order to guarantee the 
radiation safety of personnel, population and environment in 
every condition. A complete picture of SMR design and 
implication on the safety features is provided by [8]. 
Reactor safety considers accidents leading to significant, 
unmitigated releases from containment. Core Damage 
Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) 
are the most important indicators for this dimension.  Lower 
plant size allows for higher degree of passive safety features 
and design simplification as respect to LR. Such enhancements 
drive to the elimination of several classical event initiators and 
guarantee higher efficiency of mitigating systems (i.e. natural 
convection of reactor coolant). As an example, advanced SMR 
have integrated primary circuit in the reactor vessel with the 
absence of large penetrations and pipes in and out the reactor 
vessel: this eliminates the LOCA accident type. Lower 
containment size allows for improved seismic isolation 
techniques, etc..  .As aresult example, safety-by-design 
approach of Westinghouse’s IRIS permits a reduction of CDF 
from 5.1x10-7 of a GENIII+ AP1000 to 10-8 [9]. IRIS LERF is 
around five orders of magnitude less than large PWRs and the 
other GEN III+ SMR designs have a three orders lower one 
[10]. Occupational Radiation Safety refers to operators’ 
overexposure risk. Plant workers can be exposed to a high-level 
radiation during the maintenance of reactor coolant pumps, 
pressurizers, water chambers of steam generators and during 
refueling. Operators exposure is then related to planned outages 
frequency for refueling and maintenance. SMR core is designed 
for extended life-cycle, reducing the frequency of operators 
activity in the nuclear island. 
On the other side, outages are planned for each of multiple 
SMR units, considering the same installed power as LR. 
Total exposure depends on overall number and duration of 
outages, on single outage exposure for operator and on number 
of operators involved in activities. If utilities follow best 
common practices during outages, occupational exposure will 
not penalize SMRs. Public Radiation Safety considers 
collective radiation exposure to liquid and gaseous effluents 
from routine nuclear reactor operations. Each SMR has lower 
source term as compared to a LR. This do not applies when we 
consider multiple the same total output at site level. On account 
of the higher safety performances estimated, studies have been 
done about the opportunity for the Regulator to reduce IRIS’ 
EPZ to the boundaries of the plant. Safeguards refer to physical 
protection of the facility and proliferation resistance. Charlton 
[11] produces a report that can be considered the most relevant 
for this theme, synthesizing the parameter in a likelihood scale 
from 0 to 1, where the highest is the value, the highest is the 
proliferation risk. For a typical PWR LR of GEN III this value 
is 0.07, while for a SMR case with a batch loading of the fuel 
the parameter becomes 0.06. 
Moreover, portion of SMRs’ containment can be located under 
the ground, as for IRIS, mPower: the cost would be prohibitive 
for LRs.This potential low SMRs’ profile makes them an 
extremely difficult target for aircraft flying terrorists.  
Design robustness is strictly design-specific but simplification, 
standardization and compactness of SMRs permit to obtain 
certain improvement on reactor safety and physical protection.  
INPUT AND SCENARIO DEFINITION 
 
 
For the purpose of this analysis we have assumed the specific 
cost input data from [5]. According to [5], we assumed as 
specific overnight construction cost the value of 3,137€/kWe 
installed for a reference 1,620 reactor plant. INCAS elaboration 
gives specific construction costs for each of the considered NPP 
sizes, accounting for the loss of EOS and the cost savings 
coming from modularization, site co-location, learning 
accumulation and design enhancements. The former are 
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calculated on the basis of INCAS’ built-in estimation models; 
the latter is derived from a much more conservative assumption 
than SMR vendors’ declarations. Design saving factor 
represents cost savings from design-based enhancements and 
simplification as compared to same, advanced generation III 
large plants; this is the reason why we do not consider design 
cost saving factors for Very Large and Large Reactors. 
SMR operating costs are derived from larger plants’ value 
increased by a factor of 1.2x, in consideration of a loss of EOS 
in operation and maintenance of multiple, smaller plants. 
 
Considering the economics of NPP the main drivers are: 
 Plants’ size in terms of electric power output. It 
determines the Economy of scale application. 
Otherwise, INCAS assumes that the lower the size, the 
higher is the plant modularization and related 
construction cost savings. 
 Construction strategy in terms of: site co-location of 
units, deployment time-schedule. These factors 
determine the degree of learning, co-siting economies 
and interest capitalization over the construction period. 
Other country-specific input being equal (e.g. financial costs, 
EE price), four different plant sizes are considered in our 
scenarios (1,600MWe, 1,200MWe, 300MWe and 150MWe) to 
compare the opposite EOS and Economy of Multiples 
paradigms. Two scenarios are analyzed:  
 a case where the NPP fleet is deployed by three 
utilities (a big player and two minor utilities);  
 a case where the whole NPP fleet is deployed by a 
single, national investor-utility. 
The comparison of these two scenarios allow to appreciate the 
effect of learning: in the three-investor scenario, the impact of 
learning is lower due to the lower number of NPP to be 
deployed. Plant modularization and design savings remain the 
same because they are size-dependent, while site-related fixed 
cost sharing is substantially unchanged because it depends on 
the number of NPP deployed on each site. 
Fig.2 and Fig.3 present the siting configuration considering a 
total power of about nominal 11,000 MWe and five national 
nuclear sites operated by three utilities and by a single national 
player respectively. 
In our scenario each site can host either one or two large plants 
(1,600MWe or 1,200MWe, “Very Large Reactor” and “Large 
Reactor” respectively) or a number of SMR (300MWe or 
150MWe each; “Medium Reactor” and “Small Reactor” 








Acronym VLR LR MR SR 
Size [MWe] 1,600 1,200 300 150 
Life [y] 60 60 60 60 
Availability rate [%] 90 93 95 95 
O&M [€/MWh] [OECD] 7.8 7.8 9.3 9.3 
Fuel [€/MWh] [5] 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 
D&D [€/MWh] [5] 0.007 0.007 0.014 0.014 
Design saving factor [%] na na 90 88 
Modularization saving 
factor2 [%] 
na na 85 73.7 
Construction schedule [y] 5-6 5 3 3 
Table 2 - Reactor specific input 
 
Cost of Equity  [Ke, %] 15 
Financing Mix [E/(E+D), %] 50 
Debt Amortization Period [y] 15 
Cost Of Debt [Kd, %] 8 
Inflation [%/y]  1.9  
EE Price [€/MWh] 70 
EE Increase [%/y] 2.1% 
Depreciation Fixed Assets [y] 12.5 
Tax Rate [%] 35% 
Risk Free Rate 3% 
Table 3 - Country specific input 
 
Figure 2 - Site collocation strategy of NPP: three utilities 
 
Figure 3 - Site collocation strategy of NPP: single utility 
  
                                                          
2 INCAS elaboration 








1600MWe 3200 3200 0 3200 1600 11200 10080
num. of NPP 2 2 0 2 1 7 7
1200MWe 2400 2400 1200 2400 2400 10800 10044
num. of NPP 2 2 1 2 2 9 9
300MWe 2400 2400 1500 1800 2400 10500 10500
num. of NPP 8 8 5 6 8 35 35
150MWe 2100 1800 1800 2400 2400 10500 10500
num. of NPP 14 12 12 16 16 70 70
UTILITY2 UTILITY3UTILITY1








1600MWe 3200 3200 1600 1600 1600 11200 10080
num. of NPP 2 2 1 1 1 7 7
1200MWe 2400 2400 2400 2400 1200 10800 10044
num. of NPP 2 2 2 2 1 9 9
300MWe 2400 2400 2100 1800 1800 10500 10500
num. of NPP 8 8 7 6 6 35 35
150MWe 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 10500 10500
num. of NPP 14 14 14 14 14 70 70
UTILITY1
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RESULTS 
 
Simulation results show SMR project capability to meet capital 
remuneration required (i.e.15%; Tab.5). Given the uncertainty 
degree in the input and model assumptions, we may conclude 
that SMR cost effectiveness is in the range of Larger NPP: the 
impact of loss of EOS on project economics is recovered by 
Economy of Multiples paradigm and other design-specific 
features of SMR.  
 
VLR LR MR SR 
SIZE [MWe] 1,600 1,200 300 150 
Constr. 
schedule [y] 
5 6 5 3 3 
IRR [%] 14.3 13.9 14.0 15.0 15.2 
LUEC[€/M
Wh] 
75.3 79.0 77.0 72.6 70.2 
Table 4 – Three utilities scenario: profitability and cost efficiency 
indicators 
These effects allow to contain specific overnight costs: due to 
the loss of EOS, overnight cost of first stand alone MR or SR 
(300MWe and 150MWe respectively) would be 89% and 146% 
higher than a single 1,600MWe NPP. Cost abatement due to 
economy of replication reduce the gap in unit overnight costs at 
13% and 16% respectively (Fig.5). The much higher loss of 
EOS of SR is recovered by a high degree of modularization 
factor related to such a small scale (Fig.4). 
 
Figure 4 – Modularization saving factor 
Discontinuities in TCIC per NPP are evident in Figure 9 where 
it progressively decrease all along with successive NPP, until a 
site change: learning on assembling and construction can only 
be partially transferred to other nuclear sites and therefore unit 
overnight construction costs of the first unit built on a new site 
is higher than the previous NPP built on the previous site. 
 
Figure 5 – Overnight and TCIC specific costs 
Furthermore, when interest expenses are considered, the gap 
between SMR and larger NPP is reduced even more. Interest 
expenses are the cost of financial debt due to the lenders and 
they are capitalized during construction period, when the plant 
is not operating and earning any revenues from the electricity 
generation. Interest expenses during this period are called 
“Interest During Construction” and are added to the outstanding 
financial debt in order to generate further interest expenses on 
themselves. So, the more long-lasting is the construction 
schedule, the higher will be the effect of IDC capitalization. 
SMR have shorter construction periods and therefore shorter 
Pay Back Time on each NPP investment. The overall effect is a 
better control over interest capitalization and a limited TCIC. 
The latter is the sum of the overnight costs and IDC; SMR can 
compensate higher overnight costs with lower interest costs 
during construction (Tab.5) in order to have TCIC almost in 
line with larger plants. The gap is reduced to 7-10% for SMR as 
compared to 1,600MWe plant (Fig.5). Better control on 
financial expenses is confirmed by total amount of interest 
expenses due during the whole project lifetime (Tab.5). 
 
 Figure 6 –TCIC components: overnight costs and IDC 
 
TCIC are break down in the three possible sources of financing: 
Equity, Debt and Self-financing; the latter represents an internal 
source of financing only when multiple, staggered NPP units 
are built. It represents the cash flow to the equity that is 
generated from the operation of the first units and is left after 
payment of debt obligations: it may be re-invested by 
shareholders in the project it-self, to finance the construction of 
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also requires a capital remuneration and has therefore a cost 
which is the cost of equity. Nevertheless it reduces the amount 
of the up-front investment by shareholders, making multiple 
NPP projects a more affordable project, with gradual capital 
investment effort and lower average capital at risk during the 
construction period. 
 
Figure 7 – Sources of financing 
In our scenario, the sum of equity and debt up-front investment 
is significantly lower than for Large or Very Large Reactors 
(Fig.7). The balance is self-financed: capital is generated and 
invested all along the project. Cash-poorer investors may be 
able to deploy the same total power capacity with incremental 
investment in SMR, than bigger utilities do by mean of 
1,600MWe units. SMR allow for a lower up-front investment 
effort and lower capital exposure during construction period on 
account of shorter PBT for each NPP. Cost of capital is 
negotiated between investors and lenders on the basis of the 
risk/remuneration expectations: lower up-front capital 
requirement means lower exposure risk by the investor/lender 
portfolio side and lower negotiated cost of capital, all other 
parameters being equal. This effect may account for lower cost 
of debt with a virtuous impact on SMR economics, but is not 
taken into account in this work. Outstanding financial debt 
evolution confirms this hint (Fig.14 and Fig.15). Cumulated 
cash flow curve of SMR project (Fig.10) shows shorter Pay 
Back Time and lower maximum negative cash outlay than LR 
and VRL (Fig.13 and Tab.5). The latter may be assumed as a 
measure of the financial distress of the project. An investment 
project with tight financial conditions is less robust to 
unfavorable scenario changes and this again concern 
investment risk considerations, which is as a relevant issue as is 
project profitability. 
 
 VLR LR MR SR 
Constr. Schedule [y] 5 6 5 3 3 
Total financial 
expenses [bn€] 
9.6 11.5 10.7 6.8 7.7 
of which: 
 
IDC 2.3 2.9 2.7 1.1 1.3 
Maximum cash 
outlay UTILITY1 
-4.4 -4.5 -4.8 -2.7 -2.8 
Table 5 – Results: financial distress 
 
 
Figure 8 – Medium Reactors – UTILITY1: sources of financing 
per time-unit (quarter) during the construction period 
 
Figure 9 – Medium Reactors – UTILITY1: sources of financing 
per NPP 
 
Figure 10 – Medium Reactors – UTILITY1: cumulated cash flow 
curve during the construction period 
 
Figure 11 – Very Large Reactors – UTILITY1: sources of 
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Figure 12 – Very Large Reactors – UTILITY1: sources of 
financing per NPP 
 
Figure 13 – Very Large Reactors – UTILITY1: cumulated cash 
flow curve during the construction period 
 
 
Figure 14 – Medium Reactors – UTILITY1: Debt stock 
 
Figure 15 – Very Large Reactors – UTILITY1: Debt stock 
 
When total nuclear capacity is considered as a whole 
investment project, smaller sized NPP exploit their full 
potential in terms of “Economy of Multiple” benefits (Tab.6), 
such as learning efficiencies and site-related fixed costs 
sharing.  
Nevertheless multi-investor case is more realistic and 
represents the central reference case of this work. 
 
VLR LR MR SR 
SIZE [MWe] 1,600 1,200 300 150 
Constr. 
schedule [y] 
5 6 5 3 3 











The most severe criticism to the Italian nuclear program are 
project economics and safety.  
As far as plants’ safety is concerned, public acceptance should 
be differential toward a design technology with enhanced 
passive safety features allowed by the smaller reactor size. 
SMR’s improved safety standard and lower CDF as respect to 
Large passive safety reactor concepts is due to more active 
component elimination, integration of primary circuit in the RV 
with LOCA elimination, natural convection of core coolant in 
accident events; higher seismic robustness is due to smaller size 
of containment and consequent more effective insulation 
techniques. 
SMR’s great challenge is the recovery of EOS as compared to 
large sized plants. Given our assumptions and specific scenario 
conditions, this analysis shows that Economy of Multiples, 
together with design simplification and modularization, account 
for the competitiveness of a batch of SMR as compared to 
larger NPP. 
Investment modularization allowed by SMR, allows for cash 
transfer from early deployed units to later build ones with 
virtuous financial benefits: lower up-front investment, lower 
capital at risk during construction and lower financial distress 
of the project. This improves the project economics and reduces 
the investment risk.  
For potential investors, SMR represent a scalable, flexible 
investment strategy for gradual new capacity installed, that give 
the option to increase, defer or even stop the investment process 
in case of very adverse conditions such as withdraw of political 
support. Shorter construction time and consequent shorter PBT 
for each SMR unit explains better IDC control over 
construction period, against considerable interest capitalization 
and TCIC escalation incurred by large plants’ projects. 
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SMR’s LUEC may be some in line with current electricity cost 
in Italy. It has to be considered that generation costs from 
fossil-fuelled technologies will increase in the future on 
account of the carbon tax. Nuclear technology is neutral against 
carbon tax and its competitiveness against other technologies 
would enhance. SMR’s LUEC is also in line with larger NPP, in 
the range of uncertainty that characterizes input parameters and 
models. SMR are then fully entitled to compete with large NPP 




E = Equity 
D = Debt 
EE = Electricity 
EOS = Economy of Scale 
IDC = Interests During Construction 
IRR = Internal Rate of Return [%] 
Ke = cost of equity [%/y] 
Kd= cost of debt [%/y 
INCAS = Integrated model for the Competitiveness Analysis of 
Small-modular reactors 
LOCA = Loss Of Coolant Accident 
LR = Large Reactors [1,200MWe] 
LUEC = Levelized Unitary Electricity Cost [€/MWh] 
MR = Medium Reactors [300MWe] 
NPP = Nuclear Power Plant 
NPV = Net Present Value 
OCC = Overnight Construction Cost 
PBT = Pay Back Time [y] 
RV = Reactor Vessel 
SMR = Small Medium sized Reactors or Small Modular 
Reactors 
SR = Small Reactors [150MWe] 
TCIC = Total Capital Investment Cost 
VLR = Very Large Reactors [1,600MWe] 
 
REFERENCES 




2. TERNA. Dati statistici sull'energia elettrica in Italia. 
Quadro di sintesi al 11 marzo 2011. 2011. 
3. World Nuclear Association. Nuclear Power in Italy. 
[Online] 03 2011. http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf101.html. 
4. The possible role of nuclear energy in Italy. Esposto, 
Stefano. 5, s.l. : Elsevier, 2008, Energy Policy, Vol. 36, p. 
1584-1588. 
5. IAEA. Fukushima Nuclear Accident. [Online] 15 05 2010. 
http://www.iaea.org/. 
6. World Nuclear News. Italy announces nuclear moratorium . 
[Online] 24 03 2011. http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-
Italy_announces_nuclear_moratorium-2403117.html. 
7. Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory. "Reactor Oversight 
Process", NUREG-1649. U.S. NRC. Washington D.C., United 
States : s.n., 2000. 
8. IAEA. Design features to achieve defence in depth in small 
and medium sized reactors. 2009. IAEA Nuclear Energy Series 
- No. NP-T-2.2. 
9. "The design and safety features of the IRIS reactor". Carelli, 
M.D., Conway, L.E., Oriani, L., Petrovic, B., Lombardi, 
C.V., Ricotti, M.E., Barroso, A.C.O., Collado, J.M., Cinotti, 
L., Todreas, N.E., Grgic, D., Moraes, M.M., Boroughs, R.D., 
Ninotaka, H., Ingersoll, D.T., Oriolo, F. 2004, Nuclear 
Engineering and Design, Vol. 230, p. 151-167. 
10. "IRIS simplified LERF model". Maioli, A., Finnicum, D.J., 
Kumagai, Y. Miami, Florida, United States : s.n., 2004. ANES 
2004 Proceedings of International Conference October 2004. 
11. Charlton, W.S., Le Bouf, R.F., Gariazzo, C., Ford, D.G., 
Beard, C., Landsberger, S., Whitaker, M. "Proliferation 
resistence assessment methodology for nuclear fuel cycle". 
Nuclear Engineering Department, Texas A&M University. 
Texas, United States : s.n., 2008. 
 
  







year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030











































































year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
150 NPP num.
site1 1
site1 2
site1 3
site1 4
site1 5
site1 6
site1 7
site1 8
site1 9
site1 10
site1 11
site1 12
site1 13
site1 14
site1 15
site1 16
site2 17
site2 18
site2 19
site2 20
site2 21
site2 22
site2 23
site2 24
site2 25
site2 26
site3 27
site3 28
site3 29
site3 30
site3 31
site3 32
site3 33
site3 34
site3 35
site3 36
site3 37
site3 38
site4 39
site4 40
site4 41
site4 42
site4 43
site4 44
site4 45
site4 46
site4 47
site4 48
site4 49
site4 50
site4 51
site4 52
site4 53
site4 54
site5 55
site5 56
site5 57
site5 58
site5 59
site5 60
site5 61
site5 62
site5 63
site5 64
site5 65
site5 66
site5 67
site5 68
site5 69
site5 70
U
TI
LI
TY
1
U
TI
LI
TY
3
U
TI
LI
TY
2
 
